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The static tradeoff and pecking order models are tested on a sample data of 19 Kenyan finns 
listed on the Nairobi stock exchange for the period 2006-2016. Empirical results prove that 
both models can explain some pati of the capital stmcture. The static tradeoff model shows 
that finn leverage is affected by several detetminants, and the pecking order model displays 
similar movements between the change of long-tem1 debt and financial deficit. However, both 
models have shmtcomings. The static tradeoff model fails to explain the differences across 
sectors and the pecking order model fails to explain the low deficit coefficient. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION. 
1.1 Background of the study. 
The theory of capital stmcture is important for finns as they are constantly making financing 
decisions. This theory attempts to explain the sources and strategy of finance for assets of the firm. 
The decision of capital structure is called 'The Capital Structure Puzzle' by Stewart Myers (1984). 
This is so because no single theory can explain the financing decision of the firms. One of the 
prominent forms of dilemma is choosing between debt and equity for financing. How is the leverage 
of the firm determined in the world in which future cash flows are tmcertain and in which capital 
can be obtained in various fonns ranging from pure debt to pure equity is quite a paradox. Adding 
to this is the complex agency problem at all levels, that is, between insiders and the outsiders as 
well as among the insiders. Corporate decisions on capital structure policy have long been a subject 
of debate and still remain an unresolved issue. 
A wan & Amin (2014) state that there are two schools of thought on capital structure. First, that the 
value of a finn is independent of its capital structure: this means that a fitm's combination of 
securities does not have an effect on its value. Modigliani & H. Miller, (1958) put a proposition that 
the market value of any firm is independent of its capital stmcture and market secrui ties in a perfect 
financial market where there is no taxes, bankmptcy costs, agency costs, and asymmetric 
information. However, in reality, the assrunptions are in·elevant. Therefore in 1963, Modigliani and 
Miller considered the implication of taxes on debt versus equity in the companies' capital structure 
and Miller (1977) addressed the issue more specifically, showing that under some conditions, the 
optimal capital stmcture can be complete debt finance due to the preferential tax treatment of debt 
relative to equity. 
The second school of thought says that the value of a fitm is dependent of its capital structure: this 
means that a finn ' s combination ofsecruities have an effect on its value. 
Shahar et al (20 15) state that from a theoretical point of view, the two widely used models for capital 
structure are the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. They are the more accepted theories 
to model the financing behavior followed by the firms. 
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According to these two main themies, capital structure decisions are influenced by several firm 
characteristics, namely: profitability, size, age, growth opportunities, risk, asset structure, non- debt 
tax shields, and others. Pecking Order and Trade-off theories do not converge regarding the 
influence of these determinants on capital stlucture decisions. The establishment of a theory which 
explains a particular fi1m's behavior is more of an empirical issue. Hence a careful testing based on 
a propermodel is very crucial for understanding the capital stlucture behavior which this study aims 
to achieve. 
1.1.1 Theories of capital structure. 
1.1.1.1 Trade off theory. 
This themy fits in the literature initiated by Modigliani and Miller (1958) upon strong assumptions 
such as capital markets are perfect and there are neither tax or agency costs nor transaction costs 
and demonstrate that financial structure is neutral vis-a-vis the value of the company. Later on, 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) relax the neutrality axiom and include taxation: the value of an 
indebted company is equal to that of a non-corporate debt, plus the present value of the tax savings 
from debt and less the present value of costs related to potential fmancial difficulties. Hence, 
because interest are deductible from taxable profits, firms have an incentive to use debt rather than 
equity 
According to the trade-off themy of capital structure, there exists an optimal leverage ratio of the 
fi1ms. A finn would always want to be near the optimal (target) debt level and if any deviation 
happens, it gradually moves back to it. This optimal level is achieved by making tradeoff between 
the gains from debt or equity to the loss fi·om them. Benefits include interest tax shield and the 
costs include bankruptcy costs, agency costs, etc. 
1.1.1.2 Pecking order theory. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) developed Pecking Order Themy (POT) upon the asymmetry of 
information between intemal stal<eholders (owners and managers) and external providers of the 
fi1m. Business leaders adopt a financial policy, which aims at minimizing the costs associated 
with asymmetlic information, especially adverse selection, and prefer intemal financing to 
external fmancing. The pecking order theory says that there is no well-defined target debt level 




finance is not sufficient. The theory says that firms prefer intemal finance over extemal finance and 
debt over equity. 
Asymmetric inf01mation should dtive the issue of debt over equity. Debt issuance signals the 
confidence of the board that an investment is profitable and that the cunent stock price is 
undervalued. Equity issuance signals a lack of confidence in the board that may feel the share price 
is overvalued. An issue of equity would therefore lead to a drop in share price. 
However, this may not apply to intangible assets. 
1.2 Statement of the problem. 
Since the fmmulation of the Modigliani and Miller inelevance proposition, financial economists 
have been debating whether there is such a thing as optimal capital shucture-a propmiion of debt to 
equity that maximizes current finn value. Some finance scholars have fol1owed Modigliani and 
Miller by arguing that both capital stmcture and dividend policy are largely "ilTelevant" in the sense 
that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. According to Myers 
(2001), "there is no w1iversal theory of the debt -equity choice, and no reason to expect one". 
However most of the studies use a conditional theory to examine the determinants of capital 
stmcture in one company, sector or country. A conditional theory means that there are some 
detenninants related to the case subject to analysis. Frank and Goyal (2009) explain that the 
conditional the01ies can be divided into three the01ies: Pecking-order theory, Tradeoff theory and 
Market timing theory. 
The focus of this study is the pecking order theory and the h·adeoff theory. Capital stmcture 
decisions are essential to shareholders, managers and researchers seeking to understand market 
dynamics. Several studies have been in this area unfortlmately researchers have obtained different 
results as discussed in the literature review e.g Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003) 
and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
Although the vast majmity of empi1ical studies that analyze the detenninants of firm financing 
usually examine large publicly listed companies that often raise ftmds by issuing corporate debt or 
equity onto capital markets (Zingales 2000), they fail to conduct a sector analysis which is a problem 
this study aims to address. In addition, a lot of research has been conducted in developed countries. 
The conclusions drawn from theoretical and empirical research carried out in developed economies 
may not be appropriate for developing countries. 
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Lastly, most research has also focused on capital structure dete1minants as a whole rather than 
testing a particular themy (e.g., Jordan et al. 1998; Michaelas et al. 1999; Sogorb-Mira 2005). 
This study also aims at addressing this problem which may in hun help in improving future policy 
decisions. 
1.3 Research objective. 
The objective of this study is to dete1mine to what extent the pecking order theory and the 
tradeoff theory dete1mine the capital structure of listed companies in Kenya. 
1.4 Research question. 
To what extent do the pecking order themy and the tradeoff theory determine the capital 
structure of listed companies in Kenya? 
1.5 Significance of the study. 
The capital structure of a firm is very impo1iant since it related to the ability of the firm to meet 
the needs of its various stakeholders who include shareholders, managers and researchers. This 
study will be of great importance to other researchers and academicians who seek to understand 
the extent to which capital structure theories affect the capital structure of different companies. It 
will also provide insight to different scholars as it builds on previous research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW. 
This section outlines the different literature on the trade off and pecking order. 
2.1 Trade off theory. 
According to this theory, companies seek to obtain optimum capital structure and weigh up the 
advantages and disadvantages of an additional monetary w1it of debt. The advantages of this 
approach include interest payments being deductible from company tax (Modigliani and Miller 
1963; DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). Furthennore, the problem of free cash flow is reduced (Jensen 
1986; Stulz 1990). The disadvantages of debt include the potential cost of financial distress (Kraus 
and Litzenberger 1973; Kim 1978) and agency costs arising between owners and fmancial creditors 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977). If optimal capital structure is reached the benefits and 
shortfalls of debt offset each other and equilibrium is achieved. In this sense, Myers (1984) showed 
that the trade-off approach implied the rate of real company indebtedness reverting to a target or 
optimum level. 
Companies are more likely to choose debt financing up to a certain level where the cost of financial 
distress start to surface. Type of assets owned by the companies will determine the cost. For 
example, if a company has a considerable portion tangible assets i.e. land or property, they would 
have less financial distress compared to companies that rely on intangible assets. Nmmally, for 
debt financing the company needs to provide a guarantee in the fmm of collateral. Frank and 
Goyal (2005) break Myers's eadier notion of trade-off into two parts: 
1. The static trade- off themy - Myers (1984) defines the static themy as "setting a target 
debt-to-value ratio and then gradually moving towards it" (Myers, 1984). Optimal debt 
ratio is a combination of benefits and costs related to borrowing. The time period for the 
trade-off must be, according to Frank and Goyal (2007), one single period. This includes 
balancing debt tax shields against the cost of bankruptcy. Equity is substituted by debt 
and the opposite way arow1d until the maximal value of the firm is reached (Myers, 1984). 
u. Dynamic trade off theory-The dynamic models contain features that allow the trade-off 
theory to provide a better account of how fi1ms fmance their operations than had been 
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previously thought" (Frank and Goyal, 2007). Unlike the static trade-off theory, a 
dynamic theory contains multiple periods. This makes it possible to include adjustment 
costs and expectations for the future. 
2.2 The pecking order theory. 
The theory emerges as a result of asymmetlic infonnation present in fmancial markets. That is, 
corporate managers often have better information about the health and prospects of their companies 
than outside investors. Apart from the transaction costs involved in issuing new securities, 
companies have to accept the information costs arising from asymmetric infmmation. In this sense, 
new securities issued on financial markets could be undervalued due to information asymmetries. 
This is especially the case with new equities. Consequently, company managers may decide not to 
launch potentially profitable projects if they have to be financed by risky financial instruments 
(Myers and Majluf 1984). As a result, theory predicts a hierarchical order in a company's financing 
policy. Tbis order is led by the financial sources that are least subject to information costs and at 
the same time involve less risk. Internally generated funds are the prefen·ed source of financing, 
followed by low-risk short-te1m debt and then higher- risk long-te1m debt. The last option is new 
capital, which is the source of financing with the highest infonnation costs (Donaldson 1961; Myers 
and Majluf 1984). 
From the perspective of this approach, changes in the level of debt are not motivated by the need 
to reach a given debt target, but rather the need for external financing, once intemal resources have 
been exhausted and assuming that opportunities for profitable investment exist. In line with this 
theory, the key to a finn's financing is the amotmt of intemal resources that are obtained and the . 
existence of protl.table investments. Thus, one way of testing this theory is by examining financing 
decisions made after shmi-tetm changes in profits and investments, that is, by using the theoretical 
relationship between changes in the level of debt and a firm's need for funds . In this manner, debt 
is increased or decreased depending on whether or not investment requirements exceed the funds 
available intemally (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999) 
Additionally, the pecking order theory can be altematively tested by regressing a finn's debt over 
the main factors that sununarize the essential financial behavior in this approach (Jordan 
13 
et al. 1998; Michaelas et al. 1999). Thus, firms will tend to be less indebted as they generate more 
internal resources. 
The pecking order theory predicts that debt typically grows when investment exceeds internal funds 
and falls when investment is less than internal funds. Therefore, the managers' problem in each 
period is to decide which changes they will make in each fmancing resources, given the size oftheir 
fmancing deficit (surplus) and the market conditions. 
2.3 Empirical evidence. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers ( 1999) test the static tradeoff against the pecking order models, using a 
sample of 157 U.S. firms that had traded continuously over the period 1971 to 1989. In the paper, 
they embody the pecking order themy in a basic model, indicating the external debt financing 
driven by the internal fmancial deficit, and adopt a target adjustment model as the proxy for the 
static tradeoff theory. They fmd that the pecking order model has greater time-seiies explanatory 
power than the tradeoff model. They furthermore investigate the statistical power of the two models 
on hypothetical data generated by Monte Carlo simulation. Their result is that the target-adjustment 
model can generate statistically significant results even when the fmancing is generated only by 
the pecking order, while on the contrary the pecking order model is correctly rejected when the 
data is generated following the target adjustment model. 
Chllinko and Singha (2000) inquire into the validity of inferences based on Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers' basic pecking order model. They illustrate that in three situations, namely, i) when "equity 
issues constitute a more substantial percentage of overall extemal finance", though the firm prefers 
debt to equity financing; ii) when "equity issues are in the middle of the financial hierarchy", rather 
than at the end of the hierarchy; and iii) when "debt and equity are always issued in fixed 
proportions" (Chirinko and Singha, 2000, pp.422-24), the basic model proposed by Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers would generate misleading results. They claim that Shyam-Sunder and Myers' 
empirical evidence cannot evaluate the pecking order theory, and call for altemative models to test 
the competing theories. 
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Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) examine the firms' debt-equity issuance (reduction) choice 
and find that deviation from the target leverage plays a more significant role in the repurchase 
decision than in the issuance decision of securities. Their results are consistent with the pecking 
order model in the short-mn and reversion to the target leverage in the long- mn. 
Fama and French (2002) test the h·adeoff and pecking order predictions about debt and dividends 
with target-reverting models, different from models applied by Shyam-Sunder and Myers and Frank 
and Goyal. By testing on over 3000 firms covering the period of 1965- 1999, they find that the 
tradeoff and pecking order models share many predictions about debt and dividends, but differ at 
two points, where each of the two suffers a failure, the h·adeoff failing to explain why more 
profitable firms have lower book leverage, and the pecking order failing to explain why small low-
leverage growth fums issue large equity. Furthennore, they point out that when the two theories 
share common predictions, it is difficult to tell which theory the empilical results follow. 
Lemmon and Zender (2002) find no supporting evidence for the trade-off theory, yet the costs of 
adverse selection were not able to explain the pecking order financing behavior that they 
documented. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) adopt Shyam-Stmder and Myers' pecking order model with some 
modification, and test the theory on a broad cross-section of publicly traded U.S. fmns over the 
period 1971 to 1998. They conclude that when it comes to a larger sample, firms of all sizes, and a 
longer period, the pecking order model cam10t provide a satisfact6ty explanation, and net equity 
issues better track the financing deficit. 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) find that the deviation from the target capital structure has a 
significant role in the fi1m's choice of which type of security to issue or repurchase. In addition, 
their findings support the Hovakimian, Opler, and Tihnan's (2001) results that firms adjust 
toward the target leverage more actively than suggested by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
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2.4 Research gap in existing literature. 
There are three identified gaps from the existing literatme which are addressed in this study, these 
gaps are identified below: 
First, most of the above studies have been carried out in already developed countries. Very few 
studies have been conducted in emerging and developing countries which is a problem this study 
will address. 
Second, most previous empirical works on the tradeoff theory use the partial adjustment modeL 
The pa1iial adjustment model employed to examine the trade-off theory assumes that firms within 
the same industry and across industries adjust toward their target capital structme with the same 
rate. Such an assumption ignores the fact that there are significant differences in the characteristics 
of fi1ms within the same industry and across industries that affect the rate of adjustment. 
Another existing gap is that most studies focus on the detenninants of capital structure as a whole 
rather than testing a particular theory. 
2.5 Trade off theory conceptual framework. 
Figure 1: trade off theory conceptual framework 
Determinants of canital Denendent 
structure. yariable: 
Indenendent variables: 
Non debt tax shields Leverage (long 
Growth oppmiunities 
tenn debt/total 
How these determinants > assets) 





As shown in the above diagram the independent variables are non-debt tax shields, growth 
opportunities, asset tangibility, size and profitability while the dependent variable is leverage. 
2.6 Pecking order theory conceptual framework. 
Figure 2: pecking order conceptual framework 
Independent Dependent variable: 
variable: 
Financial deficit How does financial deficit > 
affect capital structure? Long term debt 
.. 
I Peckmg order theory 
I 
As shown in the above diagram the independent variable is financial deficit while the dependent 
vmiable is long term debt. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. 
This chapter will include research design, research approach, vmiables, population, sample and 
sampling techniques. The chapter will also cover the estimation models used to pe1f01m the study. 
3.1 Research design. 
The research follows a causal (explanatory) design approach as it aims to explore and explain the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables while providing additional information 
about the topic. 
3.2 Population. 
The population consists of a total of 65 companies traded on the Nairobi Securities Exchange from 
different sectors. 
3.3 Sampling. 
To obtain a representative sample from th~ population, I will select 18 listed companies from 
different sectors using simple random sampling. Every fitm will have an equal probability ofbeing 
chosen. 
3.4 Data collection. 
Data will be collected from secondary sources. The secondary data will be derived from the annual 
financial statements of these companies. The smdy used data for the period 2006- 2016 
3.5 Variables. 
The choice of variables and respective proxies was based on previous studies, such as Titman and 
Wessels ( 1988); Michaelas et a!. ( 1999); De Miguel and Pin dado (200 1 ); Sogorb-Mira (2005); 
Ramalho and Silva (2009); Gonzilez and Gonzilez (2012), and Serrasqueiro and Mac;as Nunes 
(2012). 





Leverage Long tenn Debt/ total assets 
Independent variables 
Non debt tax shields(NDTS) Measured using the ratio between 
depreciation and total assets 
Growth opportunities( GO) Ratio between intangible assets and total 
assets (Michaelas et al., 1999). 
Asset tangibility( TANG) Ratio between fixed assets and total assets 
(Michaelas et al., 1999; Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2000). 
Size(SIZE) Obtained using the natural logarithm of 
total assets, with the aim of controlling a 
possible non-linearity in the data, and the 
con- sequent problem of 
heteroskedasticity (Cardone and Cazorla, 
2001; Fama and French, 2002). 
Profitability(PROF) Ratio between earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) and assets (Michaelas et al., 
1999; Fama and French, 2002). 
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3.6 The model 
3.6.1 The static trade off model. 
3.6.1.1 The conventional regression model. 
Static tradeoff theory is mostly tested by two types of models, the target-adjustment model and the 
conventional regression model. The target-adjustment model argues that the firm has a target 
optimal capital structure. Random events dtive current debt ratio to deviate from the target, while 
the firm will try to stick to its target, therefore shows a reverting movement toward the target. 
However, in empitical analysis, the target debt ratio is not attainable, and then the historical average 
level of debt ratio is often taken as a substitute. 
The conventional regression model is based on the idea that capital structure of the firm is 
determined by many factors, and by trading off an1ong those factors, the firm can reach an optimal 
capital structure. In empirical analysis, the conventional regression model is more often applied 
than the target-adjustment model. One reason is that the latter requires data covering a much 
longer span, which is not always attainable. In this paper, the conventional regression model is 
applied to test the static tradeoff theory. The model is as below with the vmiables of fum i 
measured at the end of period t. 
Leverag«!it = a+ (l1 Profitabilityit + lh Tangibilityit + P3 Sizeit + P4 NDTSit + Ps GOit + tit 
3.6.2 Determinants of Capital Structure and Their Theoretical Implications. 
In the above model, the dependent vatiable is the leverage of the finn, and the five independent 
variables, also the five determinants of capital structure, are profitability, tangibility, firm size, 
non-debt tax shields (NDTS), and growth opportunity (GO), respectively. Theoretical studies of 
the static tradeoff theory have done much on defining determinants of the capital structure and 
predicting their signs on the capital stmcture. This study discusses the summary below: 
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3.6.2.1 Profitability. 
The static tradeoff theory generally predicts a positive correlation between profitability and fi1m 
leverage. According to tax-based models, an important benefit of debt is the corporate tax shields 
of debt More profitable firms with higher returns will, ceteris patibus, have the incentive to 
bon·ow more, in order to acquire more income tax shields. Agency-cost-based models also 
suggest that finns with higher profitability will tend to have higher debt ratio. According to Jensen 
( 1986), debt can serve to control the free cash flow problem. Large amount of free cash flow 
under the control ofthe managers will lead to their investment in low-return projects and a waste 
of fum resources. Substituting debt for stock can limit the managers' control over free cash flow 
and reduce the consequent agency costs. Therefore, firms with higher profitability will tend to 
have more debt in their capital suucture. 
3.6.2.2 Tangibility. 
The static tradeoff theory predicts a positive correlation between capital suucture and finn 
tangibility. Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency costs of debt happen because 
managers have the incentive to transfer wealth from debt holders to themselves (as equity holders) 
by investing in high 1isk:y projects after selling bonds. Lenders would be more willing to offer 
loans to firms with higher proportion of tangible assets. Large proportion of tangible assets can 
serve as collateral, reducing lenders' risk of suffering from wealth transferring; tangible assets are 
also suggested to have higher liquidation value than intangible assets. Therefore leverage of a firm 
will increase with its tangibility. 
3.6.2.3 Size. 
Leverage and finn size are theoretically predicted to have a positive con·elation. First, large firms 
are generally considered to be able to bo1row at a cheaper cost of capital, because of their 
advantages in economic scale. Second, large firms are more likely to have diversified financing 
resources, and therefore have less possibility of going bankruptcy. Third, large firms are supposed 
to be sounder in their economic activities with less volatility. Therefore leverage and finn size 
are positively correlated. 
3.6.2.4 Non-Debt Tax Shields. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) first introduce the concept of "non-debt corporate tax shields," 
referring to depreciation deductions, depletion allowances and investment tax credits. They 
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argue that non-debt corporate tax shields can substitute for debt in shielding from corporate tax. 
More tax benefits from non-debt tax shields, ceteris paribus, will lead to less need for debt, and 
therefore leverage of the firm is negatively correlated to the non-debt tax shields. 
3.6.2.5 Growth Opportunity. 
The static tradeoff theory suggests a negative correlation between growth opportunity and firm 
leverage. One reason is that high growth is mostly considered to be accompanied by high 
bankruptcy risk, and consequently lowers down debt ratio. Also according to the agency costs of 
debt pointed out by Myers (1977), highly levered firms are more likely to pass up profitable 
investment opportunities. The reason is that when debt ratio is very high, equity holders bear the 
risk and cost of investments, while debt holders might gain most of the retums. 
3.6.3 The Pecking Order Model. 
In this paper the simple pecking order model originally developed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) and modified by Frank and Goyal (2003) will be applied to test the pecking order theory. 
Define: 
DIVic =dividend payments 
Xit =capital expenditure 
11 Wit= net increase in working capital 
Cit = operating cash flows after interest and taxes 
Dit = long-tenn debt outstanding 
With the vmiables of finn i measured at the end of period t. The funds flow deficit is defined as: 
The basic equation to be tested is: 
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Where b.Dit is the amount of long-tenn debt issued - or retired, if DEFit is negative. The 
pecking order coefficient is ~PO. 
According to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), this simple model of the pecking order theory 
indicates that when a firm has need of external cash flows for its real investment and dividend 
payment commitments, the firm issues debt. 
The strict form of the pecking order hypothesis expects a =0 and ~PO = 1, predicting that all funds 
flow deficit is made up by issuing debt. But they also point out that, "if costs of financial distress 
are serious, the fitm will consider issuing equity to finance real investment or pay down debt. Thus 
a broader pecking order hypothesis would accommodate some equity issues" (Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers, 1999, p.225). Therefore, the broader form of the model will expect ~Po <1 
but close to 1. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS OF THE STUDY. 
This chapter presents results of data analysis and research findings. The study uses panel data 
analysis to estimate the parameters of interest. All estimations in this study are undertal<en by the 
statistics package, Stata. First, a joint regression analysis for the combined sectors is conducted for 
both the trade off and pecking order theories followed by a separate regression analysis for each 
sector. The study then presents an interpretation of the findings. 
4.1 Trade off theory. 
4.1.1 Overall analysis. 
The parameters of the tradeoff model are estimated using both the fixed effects and random effects 
modeL A test to choose between the fixed effects and random effects model is then carried out. A p-
value of 0.0001 is less than the level of significance (0.05) and hence the random effects model is 
rejected. Therefore the fixed effects model can be applied. This is shown below: 
Figure 3: Hausman test for overall analysis of trade off theory. 
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Results from the fixed effects model are shown below: 
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Figure 4: fixed effects model for overall analysis of trade off theory. 
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F test t3at all u i=O: ·F (18 , 185 ) 43.77 Prob > F 0.0000 
Interpretation. 
Jointly all the variables are significant as shown by the F test with a probability ofO. Looking at the 
variables individually only asset tangibility is significant, this could be due to differences across the 
panel indicated by a high rho of 85.84%. 
Growth opportunities. 
The go coefficient of 0.35084 indicates a positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage although not statistically significant (significant level=0.31 0). This is contrary to most 
prior studies such as Myers (1984) who get a negative relationship. Myers states that as bankruptcy 
and agency costs are greater for firms with high expectations of growth opportunities, firms can be 
reluctant to use high amounts of debt so as not to increase their 
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likelihood ofbankmptcy. As a result, firms with high growth opportunities may not use debt as the 
first financing option. 
Asset tangibility. 
The tangibility coefficient of 0.43 7 which is significant indicates a positive relationship. This result 
confirms with most prior studies such as Long& Malitz (1985), Rajan&Zingales (1995) and Booth 
et al (200 1 ). Michaelas et al. (1999) claim that firms, with valuable tangible assets, which can be 
used as collaterals, have easier access to external finance, and they have probably higher levels of 
debt than firms with low levels of tangible assets. 
The size coefficient of 0.0335 indicates a positive relationship of size and leverage although it is 
statistically insignificant (significance level=O.l54). This is consistent with most prior studies such 
as Rajan&Zingales (1995) and Booth et al (2001) who also find a positive relationship. Larger firms 
tend to have greater diversification of activities that implies less likelihood of bankmptcy (Titman, 
Wessels 1988). In addition, large firms with less volatile profits are more likely to take advantage 
of the debt tax shields, so increasing the potential benefits of debt (Smith, Stulz 1985). 
Profitability. 
The profitability coefficient of 0.07492 indicates a positive relationship between profitability and 
leverage. The profitability coefficient is however statistically insignificant (significance 
level=0.437). This result is consistent with some prior studies. The most profitable firms have 
capacity for a higher level of debt, taking advantage of debt tax shields (Fama, French 2002). 
Highly profitable fim1s are likely more able to fulfil their responsibilities regarding the repayment 
of debt and interests, which contributes to a less likelihood ofbankmptcy. 
Rajan&Zingales (1995) and Booth et al (2001) however, find a negative relationship. 
Non debt tax shields. 
The ndts coefficient of -0.58308 indicates a negative relationship between non debt tax shields 
and leverage. The ndts coefficient is however statistically insignificant (significance leve1=0.45). 
According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), non-debt tax shields, such as 
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deductions allowed by depreciations and investment tax credit could substitute the role of tax 
savings permitted by debt. This implies that a flrm with a high level of non-debt tax shields will 
probably have a lower level of debt than a flnn with low non-debt tax shields. Bradley, et al. (1984) 
and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) also find a negative relationship between non debt tax shields 
and leverage. 
4.1.2 Secto1· analysis. 
4.1.2.1 Agriculture industry results. 
The bausman test is carried out and the random effects model is chosen. The results are as shown 
below: 
Figure 5: Random effects model for the agriculture industry. 
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For the agriculture sector,this study found growth oppmtunity and asset tangibility to be 
negatively but insignificantly cotrelated with leverage. The coefficients recorded were -8.5464 
and -0.1193 respectively. Size, profitability and non-debt tax shields were positively but 
insignificantly con·elated with leverage. The coefficients recorded were 0.01 , 0.181 and 3.391 
respectively. 
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Table 1: Agriculture industry comparison with overall analysis results. 
Variable Coefficient sign Comparison with the 
overall analysis 
Growth oppornmity - In cons is tent 
Asset tangibility - Inconsistent 
Size + Consistent 
Profitability + Consistent 
Non debt tax shields + Inconsistent 
4.1.2.2 Banking industry results. 
For the banking industry, the bausman test was carried out but d1e test could not choose between 
the random effects or fixed effects model. Tllis is because the data failed to meet the asymptotic 
assumptions of the bausman test. 
4.1.2.3 Commer·cial and services results. 
The bausman test was ran and the fixed effects model was chosen. The results are as shown below: 
Figure 6: Fixed effects model for the commercial and services sector. 
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In the commercial and services sector, growth opportunity, profitability and non-debt tax shields 
were found to be negatively and significantly correlated with leverage. The coefficients recorded 
were -0.7095, -0.3527 and -1.2496 respectively. Tangibility and size were found to be positively 
correlated with leverage with the coefficients 2.238 and 0.0484 respectively. Size was statistically 
insignificant while tangibility was statistically significant. The overall R squared observed was 
quite high. 
Table 2: Commercial and services comparison with results of the overall analysis. 
Variable Coefficient sign 
Growth oppottunity 
Asset tangibility + 
Size + 
Profitability 









4.1.2.4 Constmction and allied results. 
The Hausman test was ran and the random effects model was chosen. The results are shown below 
Figure 7: Random effects model for the construction and allied sector. 
Ra..'"ldorr.- effects GLS regressio:1 
Gro~p variab_e: conpanyl 
R- sq: r,;ithin = 0.0909 
betwee:1 = 1.0000 
overall = 0.6384 
corr(u_i, X) 0 (assumed) 
l.everage Coef. 
go -4. 098813 
cangibi_icy .4290187 
size -. 1765469 
profi-cab.:._ity - .05 05395 





:ldC.S - 8 .990804 2. 582014 
cons 1. 595226 . 5952908 
sigma_ u 0 
s.ign:a_ e .06009235 








Nuntber o f obs 
Numl::er of groups 
Obs per group : min = 
avg = 
max = 
vlald cni: ( 5 ) 
Prob > chi: 
P> l z l [95~ Co:l:f. 
0 .546 -17. 40003 
0.117 -.1069878 
0.008 - .3072793 
0.925 -1 .109324 
0.000 -1 4 . 05146 
0.00 7 .4284774 











- .045 8145 
1.0082 4 5 
-3 .93015 
2.761975 
In the construction and allied sector, growth opportunity, size, profitability and non-debt tax shields 
were found to be negatively con-elated with leverage. The coefficients observed were - 4.098, -
0.1765, -0.051 and -8.991 respectively. Size and non-debt tax shields were statistically significant 
while gro.wth opportunity and profitability were statistically insignificant. Asset tangibility was the 
only determinant found to be positively conelated with leverage. Asset tangibility was however 
statistically insignificant. The overall R squared observed was quite high (83.84%). 
Table 3: Construction and allied comparison with overall analysis results. 
Variable Coefficient sign 
Growth opportunity 




Asset tangibility + Consistent 
Size - Inconsistent 
Profitability - Inconsistent 
Non debt tax shield - Consistent 
4.1.2.5 Energy and petroleum results. 
The bausman test was ran and the random effects model was chosen. The results are as shown 
below: 
Figure 8: Random effects model for the energy and petroleum sector. 
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From the results above we observe that tangibility, size and profitability are positively cmTelated 
with leverage with the coefficients 0.7121, 0.1911 and 0.1857 respectively. Tangibility and size are 
statistically significant while profitability is statistically insignificant. Growth opportunity and non-
debt tax shields were found to be negatively but insignificantly con·elated with leverage with the 




From the results above we observe that all the variables are negatively conelated with leverage with 
the coefficients -6.149, -4.2937,-0.058, -0.7931 and -1.5357 respectively. Growth opportunity, size 
and profitability are statistically significant while tangibility and non-debt tax shields are statistically 
insignificant. The overall R squared as shown above by the fixed effects model is very low. This 
means that the dependent variables have very little explanatory power. 
Table 5: Insurance industry comparison with overall analysis results. 
Variable Coefficient sign Comparison with 
ovet·all analysis 
Growth opportunity - Inconsistent 
Asset tangibility - Inconsistent 
Size - Inconsistent 
Profitability - In cons is tent 
Non debt tax shields - Consistent 
4.1.2. 7 Manufactming and allied results. 
The bausman test was ran in Stata and the fixed effects model was chosen. The results were as 
shown below: 
Figure 10: Fixed effects model for the manufacturing and allied sector. 
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From the results above we observe that asset tangibility, size and profitability are positively 
correlated with leverage with the coefficients 1.374, 0.3234 and 0.3824. Asset tangibility is 
statistically significant while size and profitability are statistically insignificant. Growth opportunity 
and non-debt tax shields are negatively but insignificantly coiTelated with leverage with coefficients 
-0.5785 and -2.7613 respectively. The overall R squared observed is 52.39%. 
Table 6: Manufacturing and allied Comparison with overall analysis results. 
Variable Coefficient sign Comparison with the 
overall analysis 
Growth opportunity - Inconsistent 
Asset tangibility + Consistent 
Size + Consistent 
Profitability + Consistent 
Non debt tax shields - Inconsistent 
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4.1.2.8 Automobiles, Investment and Telecommunication results. 
For these three sectors, a regression could not be run due to the limited data available (one 
company per sector). 
4.1.2.9 Summary. 
From the sector analysis conducted above, a higher overall R squared is observed in comparison 
with the overall analysis in some of the sectors that is commercial and service, construction and 
allied and energy and petroleum. This indicates a high explanat01y power. The static trade off 
model fails, however, to explain the differences in results across sectors. 
4.2 Pecking order theory. 
4.2.1 Overall analysis. 
The parameters of the pecking order model are also estimated using both the fixed effects and 
random effects model. A test to choose between the fixed effects and random effects model is 
then canied out. An observed p -value of0.6853 is greater than 5% level of significance hence 
the random effects model is chosen. This is shown below: 
Figure 11: Hausman test for the overall analysis of pecking order theory. 
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The results from the random effects model are shown below: 
Figure 12: Random effects model for the overall analysis of pecking order theory. 
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The simple pecking order model expects a =0, meaning ifthere is no financial deficit, there shall be 
no change to the debt (.6.Dit =0 when DEFt =0). However, in this study a=99.2119. This indicates 
that when DEFt =0, .6.Dit =99.2119, if there is no funds flow deficit debt will increase by 99.2119 on 
average. Tbis is contrary to the pecking order theory wbicb states that the drive of change in debt or 
debt ratio is the need of external funding. 
BPo =0.05512 proves that financial deficit (surplus) is part of the drive of the change of long- term 
debt, but it is far less than the model's expectation of equal to 1. 
The ideal of the pecking order theory is that small firms have more problems of asymmetric 
information and adverse selection, and therefore will finance deficits with debt instead of equity; 
large fmns with fewer asymmetric infonnation and adverse selection problems will 
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finance with equity. However, the reality is: that small finns bear more bankmptcy risks and other 
agency problems leads to the difficulties in bonowing, and large firms, conventionally regarded as 
having sounder management and fewer bankruptcy risks, can borrow more easily and less costly. 
Small firms, against the theoretical inference, rely heavily on equity issues instead of the debt 
issues, while large firms issue debt to finance deficits. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) prove this through testing the pecking order model for sub-samples by 
smting firms into quartiles based on total assets. In their tests for pe1iod 1971-1989, the deficit 
coefficient ~Po is 0.164 for smallest fi1ms against 0.753 for largest finns. In the tests for period 
1990-1998, ~Po is 0.087 for smallest firms against 0.675 for largest fi1ms. 
This inherent weak point results in the difficulty of embodying the pecking order theory in concrete 
models, since fitms act against what the theory expects them to do. Film may have the hierarchy in 
financing activities, but their real possibility or capability to realize the hierarchy is questionable. 
4.2.2 Sector analysis. 
The bausman test was ran canied out to choose between the fixed effects and random effects model. 
For the commercial and service sector, construction and allied sector, energy and petroleum sector 
and the insurance sector, the random effects model was chosen while for the manufactruing and allied 
sector the fixed effects model was chosen. 
The coefficients observed are presented below: 
Table 7: Pecking order sector analysis coeflicients. 
Sector Coefficient(Pro) 
Commercial and service 0.0432 
Construction and allied 0.1515 
Energy and petroleum 0.1998 
Insurance -0.1828 
Manufacturing and allied 0.0869 
The coefficients for the commercial and service sector, constmction and allied sector, Energy and 
petroleum sector and the manufacturing and allied sector show that only a fraction of the financial 
deficit drives the change in long term debt. This means that there are other factors other than 
financial deficit that drive the change in long tem1 debt. 
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In the insurance industry, the relationship between financial deficit and change in the long term 
debt is negative as indicated by the negative coefficient. 
For the agriculture and banking industry, the bausman test was canied out but the test could not 
choose between the random effects or fixed effects model. This is because the data failed to meet 
the asymptotic assumptions of the bausman test. 
For the automobile, telecommunication and investment sectors, a regression could not be nm due 
to the limited data available (one company per sector). 
A very low overall R-squared was observed for all the sectors. This could also be attributed to 
limited data. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
5.1 Discussion. 
From a joint regression of all the sectors in the trade off model, this study shows that firm leverage 
is affected by the five determinants that is growth opportunity, asset tangibility, non- debt tax 
shields, size and profitability. Overall, four out of the five detenninants are proved to have signs 
consistent with the theoretical predictions. Asset tangibility is the only variable found to be 
statistically significant. Growth opportunity was found to be positively con·elated with leverage. 
Myers (1984) however finds a negative relationship. Asset tangibility and size were found to be 
positively correlated with leverage which is consistent with Rajan&Zingales (1995) and Booth et al 
(2001). Non debt tax shields were found to be negatively correlated with leverage which is consistent 
with DeAngelo and Masulis ( 1980). Profitability was found to be positively con-elated with leverage 
which is consistent with (Fama, French 2002). 
A separate regression of each of the sectors in the trade off model shows different results. In the 
agriculture industry, none of the factors were significantly correlated with leverage. In the 
commercial and services sector four out ofthe five factors were found to be significant that is asset 
tangibility, non-debt tax shields, profitability and growth opporhmity. In the constmction and allied 
sector size and non-debt tax shields were the only factors found to be statistically significant. In the 
energy and petroleum sector tangibility and size were the only factors found to be statistically 
significant. In the insurance sector growth opportunity, size and profitability were the factors found 
to be statistically significant. Lastly, in the manufactming and allied sector, tangibility was the only 
factor found to be statistically significant. 
Literahn·e suggests that debt requirements of a fitm in one indush-y differ from the fi1m in another 
industry; hence detenninants of capital stmcture are different across industries (Titman & Wessels, 
1988). The reason for this is because in the environment, business risk varies across the industries. In 
the trade off model, the study of the 1 0 sectors provided the evidences that determinants of capital 
stmcture are different across the sectors/industries as shown by the results in chapter 4. Factors 
found to be the key determinants in one segment were found to be insignificant in another segment. 
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The test of pecking order model displays similar movements between the change of long-te1m debt 
and financial deficit, indicating that financial deficit (surplus) is part of the drive for the change of 
long-tenn debt. However, rather than the model's expectation of a financial deficit coefficient equal 
to or close to l, the deficit coefficient in this study is only 0.05512 for an overall analysis and 
0.0432, 0.1515, 0.1998, -0.1828 and 0.0869 for a sector analysis. This result indicates that fhnds 
flow deficit (or surplus) is not the only dtive for the change of long- term debt. This study cannot 
therefore support the pecking order theory. Frank and Goyal (2003) smt firms into quattiles based 
on total assets and fmd a deficit coefficient, ~po=O.l64 for small firms and ~po= 0.753 for large firms 
for the period 1971-1989. They also fmd a deficit coefficient ~Po =0.087 for small finns and ~po= 
0.675 for large fi1ms for the period 1990-1998. Shyam-Sunder, L., & Myers, S. C. (1999) find a 
deficit coefficient ~po=0.84 which is close to 1. 
5.2 Conclusion. 
This study tests the static tradeoff model and the pecking order model using panel data estimation 
on a sample data of 19 Kenyan fums listed on the Nairobi stock exchange for the period 2006-2016. 
The first chapter of the paper gives us a background of capital structure. The objectives and 
significance of the research are also mentioned here. The second chapter presents the literature 
review where the theories of capital structure and empirical literature are discussed. The third 
chapter presents the models to be tested and finally results are presented in the fourth chapter. 
Several empirical studies have examined the pecking order and trade off theory. Shyan1- Stmder 
and Myers ( 1999) asserted that Pecking Order Theory is better in explaining the fi1m 's behavior 
rather than the Traditional Trade-off Theory. According to Fama and French (2002) some fnms 
track Traditional Trade-Off Theory while others the Pecking Order Theory but none of them can 
be rejected. 
This study concludes that the tradeoff theory is better at explaining the capital structure offin11S. 
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5.3 Policy recommendations. 
Chief Finance officers of finns in various sectors of the economy should take into account the 
industry norms when making investment decisions. Capital structme of comparable companies 
in the industry should be considered because it might reflect the unique risks inherent in that 
indush-y. 
Some of the factors to consider when making capital structure decisions include profitability, size 
of the finn, growth oppmtunities of the finn, non-debt tax shields and tangibility of assets. 
5.4 Limitations of the study. 
Some of the sectors had very few finns due to data tmavailability. A regression could not be 
conducted in these sectors. 
The models used in this study are also very simple. Sharper and more dynamic models are called 
for. 
5.5 Suggested areas for future research. 
Future research should include more fitms and a longer period to increase the efficiency and 
robustness of the results. Films should also be divided into small and large size fitms for analysis. 
This is because according to pecking order and trade off theories small and large size firms have 
different theoretical predictions. Including more finns will also improve the sector analysis. 
Secondly, future research should include the target adjustment model in addition to the 
conventional regression model. Future research should also extend the study period to investigate 
the effect ofbusiness cycles on fmns' capital structure in the context of Kenya. 
In conclusion future research should consider studying both listed and unlisted fmns. This will 
provide more insight to the capital structure of firms. 
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